A third-party module used to loop positions on Aave v3 was exploited, according to SlowMist. The loss is about 114.09 ETH, worth $307,065 at the time of the transaction, taken from two Safe multisigs rather than from Aave’s core pools.
The transaction confirmed at 15:08:47 UTC on October 1, 2026, in Ethereum block 26098264. SlowMist posted its alert about 12 hours later, at 02:59 UTC on October 2. It names FlashLoopAdapter at 0x16bb8b912da187870c23ec6756bb3fad061283d8. The attacker address it lists is 0x42c2633438609881c8fBAb82414eb9A0c45F9353. The two victim Safes are 0xe3b23e47df7cd85876ac6cb05bdb9d7cd5b28520 and 0xcfedf95a3653a128dfc2e4288758a1a1850d169f.
What the Loop Safe module was doing
The module sits on top of Aave v3. Looping means a Safe deposits collateral, borrows against it, and swaps the borrow back into more collateral, repeating the cycle to raise exposure. FlashLoopAdapter is the contract those Safes had enabled as a module so the loop could open and close without a fresh owner signature each time.
That enablement is the access. A Safe module can move the Safe’s assets if the Safe has turned it on. The bug SlowMist describes is in who the adapter believes is calling it, not in Aave’s pool math.
SlowMist says open() and close() only check that msg.sender reports the adapter as an enabled module. A contract that always returns true can pass that check. The adapter’s swap path then takes a router and calldata from the caller. In this case, SlowMist says the router was set to the victim Safe and the calldata called the Safe’s own module-execution function, which the adapter was already allowed to use.
Both victim Safes recorded a successful module execution, naming the adapter at 0x16bb8b912da187870c23ec6756bb3fad061283d8. Aave’s pool logged a repayment of 1,335.26 WETH, retiring 1,329.54 of variable debt and releasing 1,306.48 weETH worth about $3.9 million. The attacker’s contract received 114.096151469674448809 ETH, and the operation was funded by an 11,537 WETH flash loan from Morpho, about $31 million, repaid within the same transaction. The gas cost was $10.55.
That net figure matches SlowMist’s count of about 114.09 ETH. Aave has published no independent loss table.
Who is exposed, and who is not
The two named Safes are the victims in the alert. Anyone else who enabled this same adapter as a module is the open question. SlowMist did not publish a list of other Safes that had it switched on.
Aave lenders and borrowers who never enabled FlashLoopAdapter are not in the loss figure. The protocol’s pools were used — debt was repaid there to free collateral — but the hole named in the alert is the module’s caller check.
Outside accounts have told users to disable the module if their Safe had it enabled. That is not an Aave or Safe instruction. Disabling a module is a Safe owner action. It does not reverse the 114 ETH already moved.
What Aave has not said
Aave’s name is in the alert because the strategy loops its v3 markets. The vulnerable contract address is not an Aave core market contract. Until the protocol or the module’s developers post, there is no confirmed patch, no pause, and no compensation plan.
Safe’s module model is working as designed: an enabled module can act for the Safe. The failure SlowMist describes is that this adapter treated “the caller says I am enabled” as proof the caller was the Safe.
No recovery, no freeze, and no attacker reply had been posted by the time of drafting.
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